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CASE COMMENTS
Negligence - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Procedural Effect
]y

ANNE DoUTHIrr

Anne Douthit received her B.S. degree in Business Administration from the
University of Denver and is a Certified Public Accountant. Presently she is a
student at the College of Law, and Note and Case Comment Editor of
DICTA.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages for personal injury caused
by the loss of her hair after she received a permanent wave administered
by an employee of the defendant beauty salon operator. The complaint
included a general allegation of negligence, and in addition the plaintiff
averred that the defendant, upon examination of her scalp, had stated
that the condition was caused by the negligence of the beauty operator.
After a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, asserting
among other things, that there should not have been an instruction to
the jury on the law governing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, nor
should the plaintiff have been allowed to rely upon tile doctrine after
pleading specific acts of negligence. The supreme court's decision in
this case reviews and attempts to clarify Colorado's somewhat confusing
law on the procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
court, in affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, concluded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor creates a presumption of law, and thereby
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, who must overcome the
presumption with a preponderan'ce of evidence. It was also held that
specific allegations of negligence, in addition to the general allegation,
do not render the doctrine inapplicable. Weiss v. Axler, 328 P.2d 88
(Colo. 1958).
A review of some Colorado cases involving the application of the
res ipsa loquiur doctrine indicates that the results have been grossly inconsistent. The majority of these cases have taken the position that the
application of this doctrine shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.'
Under this theory, a presumption of negligence arises, and the defendant
must overcome the presumption with a preponderance of evidence. A
second group of Colorado cases rejected the burden-shifting theory and
found that application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine merely shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence.- Under this theory the
burden of proof continues to be on the plaintiff. In order for the plaintiff
to satisfy his burden of proof, and make out a primna facie case, it must
be shown that the defendant had control over the instrumentality causing the injury.' Plaintiffs did not show that this necessary element existed,
therefore it would seem that the presmption of negligence, as defined
in the earlier cases, did not arise in this group of cases.
See, e.g., Gylling v. Hinds, 122 Colo. 345, 222 P.2d 413 (1950); Sanderson v.
Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 5 Pac. 632 (1884); Wall v. Livezay. 6 Colo. 465 (1882); Denver
S.P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 1 (1877); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nutter,
2 Colo. 442 (1874).
2 Brighton v. De Gregorio, 136 Colo. 1, 314 P.2d 276 (1957); Denver Dry Goods Co. v
Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P.2d 257 (1953); Boulder Valley Coal Co. v. Jernberg, 118
Colo. 486, 197 P.2d 155 (1948).
3 See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Iodgson. 91 Colo. 365, 14 P.2d 1081 (1932); Velotta v.
Yampa Valley Coal Co., 63 Colo. 4S9. 167 Pac. 971 (1917).
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A third result which has been reached in Colorado's courts, is that
the presumption is evidence to be weighed as such against that of the
defendant to determine whether or not the defendant was negligent.'
The court stated "The doctrine does not dispense with the necessity that
the plaintiff prove the fact of negligence, but is itself a mode of proving
'
negligence, and is therefore evidence." In direct conflict with this
statement, is a more recent case which states, ". . . (T) he doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur merely takes the place of evidence as affecting the
burden of proceeding with the case, and is not itself evidence."'
Another area of conflict in the Colorado courts has been the question
of the effect of the plaintiff's introducing evidence of specific negligence
or his allegation of specific negligence in the pleadings. Also difficult
to reconcile are the decisions stating the effect of the defendant's rebutting evidence. It has been held that the disclosure of the cause of the
accident by the defendant puts the two parties on equal footing as to
knowledge and means of information, and the doctrine can no longer
be applied.' Exactly opposite results were indicated, however, in a contemporaneous opinion which held that disclosure of the cause of the
accident would not necessarily prevent application of the doctrine!
Other decisions have shifted the burden of proof back to the plaintiff,
without requiring the defendant to prove affirmatively that his negligent
acts were not the cause of the injury.' The better reasoned rule seems to
be that where the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, it must be
for the jury to decide whether the defendant's evidence overcomes the
presumption." The doctrine has been made available to the plaintiff
where the defendant's specific acts of negligence were shown by the evidence." But, in another holding, res -ipsa loquitur was ruled inapplicable when specific proof of the. cause of injury was shown."
Dean Prosser has made an exhaustive study of the various applications of the doctrine in the United States." He found that the majority of
American courts treat the doctrine as raising nothing more than a permissible inference." Such an application permits the jury to infer the
defendant's negligence from the plaintiff's case without other evidence.
The plaintiff's burden of proof is sufficiently satisfied to avoid a nonsuit or dismissal of the case, but, a directed verdict for the plaintiff is
not thereby justified. This is the position followed by the federal courts.
1
The leading case, Sweeney v. Irving," provided a clear statement of the
theory. It was there specifically stated that the doctrine does not have
Colorado Springs and Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 69 Colo. 1, 169 Pac. 572 (1917).
Id. at 7, 169 Pac. at 575 (emphasis supplied).
Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P.2d 257 (1953) (emphasis
supplied).
7 St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
8 Scott v. Greeley Joslin Store Co. Inc., 125 Colo. 367, 243 P.2d 394 (1952).
Nutt v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586, 131 Pac. 390 (1913).
10 See note 4 supra and Rudolph v. Elder, 105 Colo. 105, 95 P.2d 827 (1929); Denver
Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312, 35 P.2d 852 (1934).
11 See note 8 supra.
4

12

See note 7 supra.

1' Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1936).
14 See also, Carpenter,
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 10 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 166, 171 (1937).

15 228 U.S. 233 (1912) which states, "In

our opinion 'res ipsa !oquitur' means that

the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel
such an inference, that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where
direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily
to be accepted as sufficient; that they ca.ll for explanation or rebuttal, not necessaxily that they require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that

they forestall the verdict."
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the effect of shifting the burden of proof'." Many jurisdictions go a step
farther, according to Dean Prosser, and treat a res ipsa loquitur case
as creating a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant.
In this situation, the jury is required to find the defendant negligent
in absence of evidence to the contrary. The burden of going forward
with the evidence is on the defendant, and if all the evidence is evenly
balanced, the verdict must be for the defendant. Only a few jurisdictions give the doctrine the greater effect of shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant in which case the defendant must prove by preponderance of evidence that the injury was not caused by his negligence.
The other questions raised by the instant case-the effects of the
introduction of specific evidence, of the allegation of specific negligence,
and of the rebutting evidence-seem to be as confusing in other jurisdictions as they are in Colorado. Dean Prosser, in his article dealing with
these questions found that the courts have taken at least four positions
in cases where the plaintiff has alleged specific negligence." In his
opinion, the preferable rule would be that the allegation of specific
negligence, accompanied by a general allegation of negligence, should
not defeat the plaintiff's reliance on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, if the
specific allegations should fail.'" Dean Prosser also found that it is
generally agreed that it is for the jury to determine whether or not the
evidence offered by the defendant defeats the inference or presumption
raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case. However, it should be noted
that Dean Prosser was discussing cases where the burden of proof had
not been shifted to the defendant. It is his opinion that shifting the
burden of proof by the inference raised in a res ipsa loquitur case gives
circumstantial evidence more weight than would be given to direct
evidence."
In all the Colorado cases reviewed by this writer which follow the
shift-of-burden theory, it was stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
raises a presumption of negligence. -' Prior to the instant case there has
been no effort to define or clarify whether or not the presumption was
one of fact or one of law. In 1937 American Insurance Co. v. Naylor"
clarified the effect of a presumption of fact in Colorado. There, it was
stated that such a presumption makes a prima facie case upon which, in
the absence of contrary evidence, judgment must be rendered for the
plaintiff. The burden of proof is not thereby shifted to defendant, but
onlv the burden of going forward with the evidence. This holding seems
to indicate that except where there is a conclusive presumption, or a
presuml)tion of law, the burden of proof can never be shifted.
In the instant case, it is argued that "since the court decides as a
matter of law the existence of probable negligence making a prima facie
case, the presumption is truly one of law.'"2 It is further argued that
negligence cannot be inferred in a res ipsa loquitur case, because it is
not within the discretion of the trier of facts whether to accept or reject

16 28S

U.S. at 236.

17 See note 13 supra at 255.
11 Id. at 265.
at 266.
" Id.
., See. e.g., 1ludolph v. Elder, 105 Colo. 105, 95 P.2d 827 (1939): Velotta v. Yampa
Valley Coal Co., 63 Colo. 489. 167 Pac. 971 (1917); wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 465 (1882);
Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller. 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
2' 101 Colo. 34.
70 P.2d 349 (1937).
2" 328 P.2d at 96.
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the inference. Of course. in jurisdictions where the majority rule is
followed, it is within the discretion of the trier of facts to accept or
reject the inference.' The courts of Colorado in attempting to follow
this landmark decision may find its rule a harsh and rigid one.
See, e.g., Sweeney v.

Iving. 228 U.S. 23"

(1912).
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Vorkmen's Coampfsation-Heart Injury as Compensable Accident
By JAES E. JACKSON

James E. Jackson received his A.B. degree in 1956 from the University of
Missouri, where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He is a student at the
University of Denver College of Law and is Articles Editor of DICTA.
On April 7, 1955, Frank Ciuba suffered a heart attack while in the
course of his employment. In an action under New Jersey's Workmen's
Compensation Act' he was denied compensation on the ground that
the work causing the injury was no more strenuous than that usually
incident to his employment. On appeal, held: Reversed. The work being
performed need not be unusually strenuous if it was the proximate cause
of the heart injury. Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co., 141
A.2d 761 (N.J. 1958).
By this decision the New Jersey court has expressly overruled a long
series of cases2 which held that a heart injury must arise out of unusual
exertion to be compensable. As a result New Jersey is now aligned
with a majority of states which hold that any exertion in the course of
employment which produces heart injury creates a compensable accident.' This holding is even more significant in view of the fact that
New Jersey has been considered one of the leading proponents of the
minority rule requiring unusual exertion.'
The rationale of the minority rule is that the heart injury must
be the result of an accident and not the accident itself. Thus, before
an "accident" can be found something unusual in the work must have
occurred. Applying this rule, Michigan has denied compensation for a
heart injury which occurred in performing unusually hard work, since the
alleged accident, i.e., overexertion, was in reality intentional and not
accidental.' This holding seems to be unique since most states that follow
the minority rule will consider a heart injury incurred under such
circumstances to be accidental.'
The minority rule has been severely criticized on three grounds.
First, the requirement that the accident must be the cause of the injury
instead of the injury itself is said to be a misinterpretation of the word
"accident" as usually intended by workmen's compensation acts. 7 Second,
it is said to be erroneous to hold that lifting a 200 pound weight with
a consequent heart injury is an accident while lifting fifty pounds with
the same result is not.' Third, it is said to be obviously impractical to
I N.J.

Stat. Ann.. c. 34. § 15-7 (1937).
Seiken v. Todd Dry Dock. Inc.. 2 N.J. 469, 67 A.2d 131 (1949): Temple v. Storch
Trucking Co., 3 N.J. 42, 68 A.2d 828 (1949); Mannery v. Waters, 8 N.J. Super. 57, 73
A.2d 266 (App. Div. 1950); Franks v. Mack Manufacturing Co., 5 N.J. Super. 1, 68
A.2d 267 (App. Div. 1949): Schroeder v. Arthur Sales Co.. 5 N.J. Super. 287, 68 A.2d
878 (App. Div. 1949); Irons v. New Jersey Dep't of Institutions and Agencies, 3 N.J.
Super. 216, 66 A.2d 44 (App. Div. 1949).
3 See collection of cases in 1 Larson, -Workmen's Compensation Law § 3,S.30, n. 19
(1952). Professor Larson lists as following the majority rule: Ark., Conn., Ga.. Ida.,
Ill., Ind., Kans.. Ky., La., Me., N.M., Okla.. S.C., Tex., Utah. -\\ ash., AN. Va.. and Wris.
4 Id. § 38.64.
Crossweller v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 294 Mich. 443, 293 N._W. 711 (1940).
'Larson, op. cit. supra. note 3, § 38.20-30, n. 18 and 19. The Crossweller case seems
to be ignored even in Michigan. Cf. Schlange v. Blriggs Manufacturing Co., 326 -ich.
552, 40 N.W.2d 454 (1950).
Bohlen, A Problem in Drafting Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev.
328, 337 (1912).
9 Larson, op. cit. supra note 3. § 38.61-63.
2

DICTA

SEI'TEIiiF.R-OcToISlER,

1958

determine when exertion is unusual since almost all forms of manual
labor involve tasks of varying degrees of exertion
The effect of the minority rule is a mass of cases with extremely fine
distinctions as to when exertion is unusual. New York, still nominally
committed to the "unusual" test,1" has reached the point where almost
any type of exertion will be termed unusual."
In the instant case the New Jersey court, in overruling its prior
decisions, relied heavily upon English cases "- decided under an act which
is a prototype of the New Jersey act. These cases were decided prior to
the adoption of the New Jersey act, and the court considered their interpretation as having been intended by the legislature. In Clover,
Clayton, and Co. v. Hughes," the court declared that an accident "arises
out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work whatever the degree
of exertion or the condition of health.""
In Colorado the trend represented by the instant case has been
completely reversed. Beginning with Carroll v. Industrial Commission,"
the majority rule was clearly adopted. However, cases subsequent to
Carroll began to use the phrase "overexertion" without expressly overruling Carroll or adopting the unusual circumstances test." In Coors
9Ibid.
'0

Lerner v.

Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334

(1925).

"1 See Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950); Serie v.

F & Mf Schaefer Brewing Co., 273 App. Div. 833, 76 N.Y.S.2d 50 (3d Dep't 1948):
McCormack v. Wood Harmon Warranty Corp., 263 App. Div. 914, 32 N.Y.S.2d 145
(3d Dep't 1942).
12 Fenton v. Thorley, (1903) AC. 443: Clover, Clayton and Co. v. Hughes, (1910)
A.C. 242.
'3 (1910) A.C. 242.
"4 Id. at 247.
15 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921). "By the term 'injury' is meant, not only an

injury the means or cause of which is an accident, but also any injury which
itself an accident."

is

16 Industrial Commission v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458 (1940); Industrial Commission v. W\etz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937); Ellerman v. Industrial
Commission, 73 Colo 20. 213 Pac. 120 (1923).
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Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell," the court created conllusion in the rule by
distinguishing two prior casess on grounds that recovery was had because unusual circumstances had produced the injury. This conclusion
was dictum and seems unwarranted since an examination of the court's
opinion in those cases shows that the Carroll test of usual exertion was
followed." In 1943, the court stated the Colorado rule to be that "overexertion" is required." Then, in Industrial Commission v. International
Minerals and Chemical Corp.,' the court clearly stated the minority
rule, saying, "It has been the consistent holding of this court that in
such cases claimant must prove more than mere exertion attendant upon
the usual course
of the employnmnt, and that overexertion must be
2 established.''
The phrase "overexertion" seems to have created much of the confusion in the Colorado cases. However, except for the International
Minerals case, this confusion is possibly more apparent than real. In
an early case2 " the Colorado court accepted the majority view that any
exertion causing heart injury is overexertion to that particular person.'
Using this definition of overexertion all the cases up to International
Minerals are consisten t.' - However, in that case the word overexertion
is equated with un usual circumstances, which indicates that Colorado
might follow the minority rule. Since the court in InternationalMinerals
quite clearly didn't intend to overrule all its prior decisions,"" it is possible
that the case will not be followed as stating the minority rule which
New Jersey has now expressly repudiated.-"
17 109 Colo. 39, 121 11.2d 669 (1942).
"s Industrial Commission v. Mcl'lenna. 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458 (1940); Industrial Commission v. \Vetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937).
' The
A\etz case dealt with whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a
finding of exertion. The court expressly referred to the exertion as customary in the
work. The McKenna case dealt with whether the work was the proximate cause of
the injury. The unusual exertion was referred to for reasons of proving proximate

cause, and not as a prerequisite for recovery.
20 Black Forest Fox Ranch v. Garret, 110 Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (194.3).

- 132 Colo. 256. 287 P.2d 275 (1955).
Id. at 260, 287 P.2d at 277.
23 U.s. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 96 Colo. 571, 45 P.2d
895 (1935).
" "The defendant bank had Yuenger in its service with his resistance to exertion . . . not an individual with a resistance to exertion denominated as normal

resistance. The important question here is. whether what occurred was overexertion
for him .
I..."
Id. at 579, 45 P.2d at 898.
25 Omitting the dictum of the Coors Porcelain case.
20 The court cites the U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty case as supporting its rule.
See note 23 supra.
27 The denial of recovery in International
lack of proximate cause.

M'\inerals could easily have been based on

